Boiling Water Reactor



1.	Introduction to Structural Reliability in Nuclear Engineering
1.1.	Risk based reliability engineering
1.2.	Mitigation Strategies
1.3.	Basics on Nuclear Power
1.4.	Pressurized components of NPP
1.5.	**BWR-Fukushima Accident**
1.6.	RBMK Reactor – Chernobyl accident
1.7.	Specifics of nuclear power engineering
1.8.	Production of medical isotopes

Fukushima – Lessons to be learned

11.03.2011

Tōhoku Earthquake
14.46 JST
Magnitude 9 (MW)

→

Tsunami
14 m Height

→

Station 1,2,3,4
Black-out


Pacific Plate
Main Shock 9 M_W
9 cm/a
Fore- and Aftershocks
AJIGASAWA
NOHEJI
HIROSAKI
Sambongi
ODATE
AKITA
MORIOKO
MIYAKO
HANAMAKI
MIZUSAWA
SAKATA
ICHINOSEKI
TSURUOKA
SANUMA
ISHINOMAKI
Murakami
YAMAGATA
NIIGATA
YONEZAWA
MAKI
HARAMACHI
NAGAOKA
WAKAMATSU
Wajima
NAOETSU
KOIDE
TAJIMA
TOGI
HIMI
UOZO
Iiyama
Nikko
ISURUGI
NAGANO
Numata
UTSUNMIYA
HITACHI
KOMATSU
FUNATSU
UEDA
MAEBASHI
SHIMODATE
TAKAYAWA
FUKUI
SUWA
KUMAGAY
TAKEFU
NODA
OMIGAWA
HACHIMAN
AKAHO
ENZAN
TSURUGA
TOKYO
NARUTO
Mino
OI
IIDA
FUJI-YOSHIDA
MOBARA
NAGAHAMA
HIRATSUKA
SETO
OHARA
ECHIGAWA
YOSHIWARA
Misaki
HINO
Kariya
Shizuoka
Ito
Tateyama
Seki
Nishi-Hazu
Shimada
Matsuzaka


テレトラック
MIYAKO

- All operating units were automatically shut down
- Emergency D/Gs have worked properly until Tsunami attack

Tsunami:	14 m
Design:	5,7 m
Protection:	6,5 m





"Three of the reactors at Fukushima I overheated, causing meltdown that eventually led to explosions, which released large amounts of radioactive material into the air"

We feel deep sympathy with the Japanese People

We
the international nuclear community,
the engineers, authorities, owners, and media
are concerned and take the responsibility

We
have to learn the lessons from Fukushima


HD
NHK WORLD
NHK WORLD
NEWSLINE
The scale of the disaster from Friday's catastrophic earthquake and tsunami in northeaster


HD
NHK WORLD
www.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/
NHK



- Reactor Service Floor (Steel Construction)
- Concrete Reactor Building (secondary Containment)
- Reactor Core
- Reactor Pressure Vessel
- Containment (Dry well)
- Containment (Wet Well) / Condensation Chamber



Course of Events

Heat generation: (due to decay of fission products)

After SCRAM ~6% After 1 Day ~1% After 5 Days ~0.5%

Emergency Core Cooling Systems

1) Residual Heat Removal System
2) Low-Pressure Core Spray (for LOCA)
3) High-Pressure Core Injection (for LOCA)
4) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (Unit 2,3 [BWR4])
5) Isolation Condenser (Unit 1 [BWR3])
6) Borating System



Course of Events

Fukushima I Unit 1

(1) Isolation Condenser

- Steam enters heat exchanger
- Condensate drains back to reactor pressure vessel
- Secondary steam released from plant

Need pumps for water supply

Fukushima I Unit 2 and 3

(2) Reactor Core Isolation Pump

- Steam from reactor drives turbine
- Turbine drives a pump, pumping water from the wet-well in the reactor
- Steam gets condensed in wet-well

Necessary:

- Battery power
- Wet-well temperature < 100°C

No heat sink from the buildings



Course of Events

Loss of Coolant Accident LOCA

- **11.3. 16:36 in Unit 1**
  - Isolation condenser stops
- **13.3. 5:30 in Unit 3**
  - Reactor Isolation pump stops
- **14.3. 13:25 in Unit 2**
  - Reactor Isolation pump stops
- **Reactors of Units 1-3 are cut off from any kind of heat removal**



Course of Events

- **~50% of the core exposed**
  - Cladding temperatures rise, but still no significant core damage
- **~2/3 of the core exposed**
  - Cladding temperature exceeds ~900°C
  - Balooning / Breaking of the cladding
  - Release of fission products from the fuel rod gaps



Course of Events

~3/4 of the core exposed

- Cladding exceeds ~1200°C
- Zirconium water reaction starts under steam atmosphere

  $Zr + 2H_20 \rightarrow ZrO_2 + 2H_2$
- Exothermal reaction heats the core additionally
- Generation of hydrogen
  - Unit 1: 300-600kg
  - Unit 2/3: 300-1000kg
- Hydrogen gets pushed via the wet-well, the wet-well vacuum breakers into the dry-well



Course of Events

- at ~1800°C [Unit 1,2,3]
  - Melting of the cladding
  - Melting of the steel structure
- at ~2500°C [Unit 1,2]
  - Breaking of the fuel rods
  - debris bed inside the core
- at ~2700°C [Unit 1]
  - Melting of Uranium-Zirconium eutectics
- Supply of seawater to the reactor pressure vessel stops the core melt in all 3 Units
  - Unit 1: 12.3. 20:20 (27h w/o water)
  - Unit 2: 14.3. 20:33 (7h w/o water)
  - Unit 3: 13.3. 9:38 (7h w/o water)



Course of Events

- **Containment** **(MARK I)**
  - Last barrier between fission products and environment
  - Wall thickness ~30 mm
  - **Design pressure 4-5 bar**
- **Pressure reached up to 8 bars**
  - Normal inert gas filling (Nitrogen)
  - Hydrogen from core oxidation
  - Boiling in the condensation chamber
  - Possible leakages at containment head seal
- **Depressurization of the containment**
  - Unit 1: 12.3. 4:00
  - Unit 2: 13.3 00:00
  - Unit 3: 13.3. 8:41



Course of Events

- **Unit 1 and 3**

  Hydrogen explosion inside the reactor service floor

  - Destruction of the steel-frame construction
  - Reinforced concrete reactor building seems undamaged



Mark of Respect

We pay full respect for the accident management
to
the technicians, engineers, and management,
for their
reasonable, professional, and eventually successful commitment
under the
concurrence of extremely severe circumstances

Accident Mangement

- **Sea water stopped accident progression**
  - No further core degradation
  - RPV temperatures decline
  - No further releases from fuel

- **Further cooling of the reactors via**
  - Unit 1: Isolation Condenser
  - Unit 2 & 3: Containment Venting



Accident Mangement

- **Short-term recovery steps**
  - Trap fission products on ground with dust binders (Epoxy)
  - Install closed cooling cycles
  - Decrease the water inventory in the Reactor buildings
  - Build storm-prove shelters around the reactors (especially a roof)
- **Long-term recovery steps**
  - Build a water cleansing facility to decontaminate the stored water
  - Remove Salt from Reactors
  - Empty the spend fuel pools
  - Wait 10 Years that radioactivity declines [see TMI2]
  - Remove Core inventory



Accident Mangement

Happy Moments:

Recovery of Main Control Room Light

Unit 3: March 22 Unit 2: March 26
Unit 1: March 24 Unit 4: March 29

Accidental Damage

Earthquake & TSUNAMI
a natural disaster of historic magnitude

Death Count: 25,000 People

Economic Loss: $ 250 billion

FUKUSHIMA
a man-made disaster of cat. 7 on INES

Radiation Fatality: No
Exposure > 250 mSv: 6
Release ~ 10% Chernobyl

Decommissioning: $ 2.53 billion (TEPCO Allocation)

Lessons learned

Design Rules
Aging Systems
Knowledge

Codes and Regulations
Licensing
Controlling

Key Focus:
Nuclear Safety



Public Media
Risk Acceptance
Framing&
Agenda Setting

Responsibility
Business &
Safety Culture

Engineering Lessons

CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS ARE INEVITABLE

Safety Indicator:
Frequency f of Core Melt Accidents

NRC (**Mandated)**: f < 1 in 10,000 years
Modern design: f < 1 in 100,000 years

"First and most elementally, nuclear accidents happen…we can never have confidence that we will succeed absolutely."
(*John Ritch, Director General, WNA)*

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SYSTEM SAFETY DESIGN PRINCIPLES

After lessons we know better:

06-11: IAEA Ministerial Conference

- External Hazards
- Accident Management
- Emergency Preparedness

Report of Japanese Government

IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, Vienna, 21 June 2011

Engineering Lessons

NO OVERCONFIDENCE - SEVERE ACCIDENTS MAY HAPPEN

GLOBAL COOPERATION IN SAFETY ENGINEERING

APPROPRIATE EVALUATION AND PROTECTION AGAINST EXTERNAL HAZARDS

CONTROLLED SYSTEM SAFETY DESIGN RULES (INSAG)

-DEFENCE IN DEPTH & INHERENT/PASSIVE SAFETY- ACCORDING TO THE LATEST STATE-OF-THE-ART

SAFETY CULTURE

DEFENSE IN DEPTH
with
PROBABILISTIC RISK ANALYSIS

INHERENT SAFETY DESIGN
with
HIGHEST BASIC REQUIREMENTS

Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference

External Hazard / Common Mode Failure

Flooding

Black-Out

Loss of Heat Sink

H_2 in the Service Floor

Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling

NPS and Component Design

TSUNAMI Height: 14 – 15 m

Seawater Pump

Switchboard

Diesel Generators

Battery Life

MARK I Containment

SAFETY CULTURE

??

Safety Culture

Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference
Japan will Establish a Safety Culture …
Pursuing Defense-in-Depth by Constantly Learning Professional Knowledge on Safety

THOROUGHLY INSTIL A SAFETY CULTURE

A Safety Culture that Governs the Attitude and Behavior in Relation to Safety of all Organizations and Individuals Concerned must be Integrated in the Management System
(IAEA: Fundamental Safety Principles, SGF-1, 3.13)

Safety Culture

POST FUKUSHIMA WORLD

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY:

NATIONAL OPERATIONAL TRANSPARENCY
- INDEPENDENT , EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR REGULATION
RE-VISITATION of THREATS of EXTERNAL HAZARDS
BINDING INTERNATIONAL SAFETY STANDARDS
Yukiya Amano, IAEA (June 21):
- Safety Checks on a regular basis by IAEA Inspectors -

Public Opinion

Respect for the negative Stance on Nuclear Power

We all feel the task of mastering the future



Public Opinion



Public Opinion



DEVIL'S BARGAIN

THE BEST LESSON
LET US WORK TOGETHER FOR ONE WORLD